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Spanish savings banks (SBs) are financial institutions with a wide mission that includes different stakeholders’ goals.
Profit maximization is only one among several goals, and the widespread use of cost or profit efficiency as the only com-
parative performance measure may prove to be insufficient in this context. To overcome this problem, we build an aggre-
gate performance index for organizations with multiple goals. Furthermore, we show how the ownership structure of SBs
influences their economic behavior in two basic ways: (1) the performance level and (2) their goal priorities. In particular,
we distinguish two types of ownership structures in our application, namely, organizations controlled by Public Admin-
istrations and those controlled by insiders (i.e. managers and workers). Our results indicate that each type has different
priorities and differ in their performance indexes. More specifically, the empirical analysis shows that insider-controlled
SBs favor goals related to profit maximization and the universal access to financial services and, furthermore, they perform
better. In contrast, contributing to regional development becomes the most favored goal when Public Administrations
have a majority in the bank.
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between regulation, ownership structure and eco
nomic behavior of Spanish savings banks (SBs) dur
ing the period 1998 2002. The three objectives we
aim to cover are: (1) an assessment of how regula
tion affects the ownership structure and the objec
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 935812147.
E-mail addresses: cestona@selene.uab.es (M. Garcı´a-Cestona),str

jsurroca@emp.uc3m.es (J. Surroca).alysis of the efficiency levels and goal priorities
these financial institutions, and (3) an evaluation
regulation efficiency. To achieve these objectives,
employ existing methodological developments in
e area of data envelopment analysis (DEA).
Our analysis is related to two different strands in
e literature on frontier efficiency analysis: one
cuses on the link between banks organizational
rms and frontier efficiency, while the other studies
lue judgments in DEA models. Within the first
and, substantial research effort has gone into
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Sanswering the question of whether bank ownership
influences economic behavior (Berger and Hum
phrey, 1997). In particular, previous studies have
examined the differential effect on efficiency of
mutual versus stock owned banks (Cebenoyan
et al., 1993; Mester, 1993; Altunbas et al., 2001),
banks with stocks traded on capital markets versus
private banks (Tulkens, 1993), government owner
ship versus private banks (Altunbas et al., 2001),
foreign versus domestic banks (Chang et al., 1998;
Bhattacharya et al., 1997; Fukuyama et al., 1999;
Sathye, 2001), minority versus non minority owned
banks (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1992), and small
versus large banks (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995),
among others. Concerning the Spanish banking
industry, there are several studies (Grifell Tatje´
and Lovell, 1997; Tortosa Ausina, 2003) that have
assessed the efficiency of savings banks and com
mercial banks, postulating whether the differences
in ownership between these organizational forms
may lead to different efficiency levels.
One potential drawback of most applications in
this area has been the lack of the behavioral objec
tives of each organizational type at the time of com
puting efficiency. The measurement of performance
becomes a function of how well an organization
achieves its objectives (Piesse and Townsend,
1995), and in many of the previously mentioned
comparisons between organizational forms the
equality of objectives cannot be taken for granted.
For example, when comparing mutual banks with
other organizational forms, one should take into
account the complexity of the behavioral objectives
of these institutions (Worthington, 2004) objec
tives that are more closely related to the maximiza
tion of the services provided to members (Fried
et al., 1993). Therefore, profit maximization does
not seem the most appropriate goal for measuring
the performance of mutual banks. Similarly, the
organizations we are interested in Spanish savings
banks pursue, by law, a wide set of goals. Further
more, given the absence of shareholders, making a
profit becomes only one among several measures
of success. Due to the fact that the control of SBs
has been allocated, also by law, to several types of
stakeholders, each one with different interests, SBs
try to demonstrate that they are well managed, peo
ple oriented, accessible to the individual, friendly to
the small investor, and in touch with the local com
munity (Serrano Cinca et al., 2004). Therefore, to
measure their performance, we need to go beyond
traditional efficiency indicators and look furthernto the way they create value for their stake
olders.
Until now, however, a common feature of all
apers that evaluate the efficiency of Spanish sav
ngs banks is the use of the very same indicators
nalyzed in commercial banks. That is, by means
f productivity (Grifell Tatje´ and Lovell, 1997; Pas
or, 1995), costs (Lozano Vivas, 1998; Maudos
t al., 2002; Maudos and Pastor, 2003; Tortosa
usina, 2003) or profits (Kumbhakar et al., 2001;
ozano Vivas, 1997). Thus, previous studies have
ll omitted the multiple goal nature of SBs, which
enders the use of only costs or profits inadequate
s a way of measuring managers’ efficiency.
As mentioned above, this paper is also inspired
y the literature on weight restrictions in DEA. As
iscussed in the comprehensive review by Allen
t al. (1997), the most widespread method for con
idering judgments or preferences in DEA models
s the use of restrictions on weights. These restric
ions are imposed in an attempt to incorporate the
ecision maker’s preferences into the assessment of
fficiency. Typically, the value preferences included
n previous studies reflected either top manage
ent’s or the researchers’ views on the relative
mportance of inputs and outputs. To the best of
ur knowledge, only two studies (Thanassoulis,
000; Lins et al., 2007) have considered the regula
or as a key actor whose preferences must be incor
orated in the assessments. In this study, we focus
n another kind of regulation: the regulation affect
ng the ownership structure of organizations. More
pecifically, we assume that regulator preferences on
utputs are expressed by means of the voting distri
ution in the governing bodies of an organization.
In this paper, data envelopment analysis methods
re used to elaborate an aggregate performance
ndex that combines multiple goals where profit
aximization is one among several goals and it
lso calculates the relative importance of each goal.
ome idiosyncratic features make this methodology
pecially suitable in this context: DEA is quite effec
ive in handling complex processes of organizations
hat do not behave like traditional firms, but use
ultiple inputs to produce multiple outputs, or
hen the weights (i.e., the relative importance)
ttached to each input/output are unknown. Several
uthors have acknowledged the potential of DEA
ethodology to assess the performance of those
rganizations that violate the behavioral assump
ions under which commercial banks operate.
panish savings banks constitute one of these
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byorganizations and credit unions provide another
example. Regarding this later type of organizations,
Fried et al. (1993, p. 253) argued, ‘‘since credit
unions are owned and operated by members, the
objectives of credit unions can be thought of as
maximizing the services provided to members. This
immediately suggests that profit maximization is not
the most appropriate objective’’. Therefore, in sev
eral empirical works measuring the efficiency of
financial mutual organizations, profit maximization
is not assumed: Mester (1993) for savings and loans
in the US, Fried et al. (1993) for credit unions in the
US, Piesse and Townsend (1995) for British building
societies, or Worthington (1998, 2004) with credit
unions in Australia.
We use the above methodological proposal in
comparing efficiency under multiple goals in the case
of Spanish savings banks. We consider the existing
agency relationship between the executive managers
of the savings bank (the agents) and the legislator
(the principal), who establishes a wide mission for
the bank. Accordingly, a savings bank’s manager
should replace the profit maximization goal with
the maximization of the aggregated goals included
in the mission. Yet, agents have their own prefer
ences on how to combine those multiple goals, and
these are not always coincident with the legislator’s.
Thus, our measure of performance incorporates this
multiplicity of goals and, subsequently, it includes
legislator preferences on those multiple goals. Fur
thermore, we assume these preferences are implicitly
expressed in the voting distribution among stake
holders, through the percentages established by the
legislator in the general meeting. By adding this con
straint (i.e., the voting distribution) to the DEA
model, we enhance the analysis, defining what the
legislator considers best practice, and we also make
comparisons between management choices and leg
islator preferences. Then, the overall efficiency of a
SB will be a measure of the agent’s ability to take
decisions in an economically efficient manner while
satisfying regulator preferences. Similarly, ineffi
ciency will measure the failure to optimally allocate
goals into the transformation process following reg
ulator preferences on outputs. Besides, the measure
of convergence between the preferences of managers
and regulator preferences becomes an indication of
the effectiveness of ownership regulation.
This study contributes to the operational research
literature by highlighting the potential of applying
certain methods developed in this field to analyze
new economic problems with clear practical andlitical implications. In this sense, dual DEA pro
ams provide relevant information, the multipliers
weights, which also indicate the relative impor
nce (i.e., the order) of outputs. Therefore, as a first
ntribution, this paper investigates whether it is
ssible to elucidate if different ownership structures
ply different output rankings. Moreover, DEA
lows the inclusion of given preferences that are
corporated into performance assessment through
strictions on weights. In a context like the Spanish
nking industry, where organizations commercial
nks, SBs and credit cooperatives compete on
ices or quality of services, with little regulatory
strictions on these variables, the government may
fluence SBs’ economic behavior through the com
sition of the governing bodies. It allocates control
different stakeholders and defines the vote distri
tion among them. Consequently, in this paper,
e consider that regulator preferences over outputs
e defined by means of the current legislation on
s’ governing bodies a type of weight restriction
t previously considered in the DEA literature.
ore importantly, the comparison of efficiency
ores and weights of DEA programs with and with
t weight restrictions will allow us to measure the
ectiveness of such a regulatory policy. The result
this comparison has important practical implica
ns in Spain where there is a hot debate over the
ture of this organizational form. The discussion
cuses on the appropriateness of reducing public
rticipation in the ownership structure of SBs in
der to improve their efficiency.
In addition, through these new avenues of appli
tion of DEA methods, we are advancing the
derstanding of the effects that ownership struc
re has on the economic behavior of organizations
four important ways. First, we measure the per
rmance of organizations with multiple goals, for
hich profit maximization (or cost minimization)
only one among several goals to be achieved. Sec
d, we examine in detail the ownership structure
organizations, describing differences in the
mposition of general meetings within the same
ganizational form. In particular, we empirically
vestigate the effect that different compositions of
neral meetings exert on the degree of achievement
corporate goals, and we also test if managers take
to account stakeholder preferences at the time of
tablishing goal priorities. Third, we build an
gregate measure of performance that incorporates
e various different regulatory constraints faced
managers in different ownership types, that is,
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regulator also pursues its own goals and, for example, the Bank
of Spain plays an active role in monitoring the banks’ solvency.
2 Incidentally, this distinction also responds to the European
authorities’ concern regarding the role of banks controlled by
public administrations.
4different legislator preferences over multiple goals.
Finally, we extend the empirical evidence of the
effects of public ownership on efficiency, explaining
the possible causes of inefficiency.
The remainder of this article is structured as fol
lows. In Section 2, we briefly review the key features
of savings banks to define their mission and identify
the stakeholders. In Section 3, we present the rela
tionship between the proposed methodology and
the underlying economic problem. The data and
variables used in the empirical application are
described in Section 4; the results appear in Section
5, and sensitivity analyses in Section 6. The paper
ends with a discussion of the results, limitations
and conclusions.
2. Spanish savings banks: Mission, stakeholders,
ownership structures and regulator preferences
SBs compete among themselves, with commercial
banks, and with credit cooperatives. Therefore, they
are subject to the general discipline of the loan and
deposit markets. This competition is particularly
relevant now, after a deregulation process that
demands from savings banks similar levels of effi
ciency to their private competitors (Kumbhakar
et al., 2001). In institutional terms, SBs are private
foundations and, as such, their social function
requires that part of their profits be allocated to
activities that improve the well being of the region
where they belong. Moreover, in the absence of
shareholders, the ownership of these banks corre
sponds to the various different groups represented
in the general meeting and, therefore, ownership is
not the result of a purchase or exchange as is the
case for commercial banks. Even more interesting
for our purposes is the presence of multiple goals
that the regulator explicitly includes in the savings
banks’ mission.
2.1. Mission and stakeholders
The current situation is mostly the result of Law
31/1985, (known as LORCA), which favored the
inclusion of the interests of the regions where sav
ings banks are present, along with a more profes
sional management of SBs. Thus, on the one
hand, savings banks could adapt to the peculiarities
of their region, looking for a greater implication of
SBs in regional development and, on the other
hand, they have experienced an organizational
change, trying to balance the interests of the variousifferent social groups. Current regulation estab
ishes the composition of the governing bodies (gen
ral meeting, board of directors and control
ommission) of savings banks with representatives
rom four social groups: 15 45% of the seats for
he representatives of depositors, employees take
15% of the seats, founder entities take 10 35%
nd, finally, between 15% and 45% of the seats are
or the public administrations (City Halls, Local
nd Regional governments).
The result of this particular evolution of the SBs is
group of organizations whose legal nature resem
les that of ‘‘commercial non profit organizations’’
n the words of Hansmann (1996). They undertake
he typical activities of banks, searching for eco
omic efficiency and profit maximization but their
rofits go mostly to social programs and charity.
All these features allow us to talk of multiple
oals for SBs; that is, a wide mission justified by
he presence of stakeholders represented in the gov
rning bodies.1 Table 1 summarizes the various dif
erent goals of SBs. As a summary of this, we define
he SBs mission in the following terms: ‘‘SBs help to
ake financial services a universal service, rendered
nder conditions of economic efficiency, preventing
buses of market power, while at the same time con
ributing both to a better allocation of the created
ealth and to the sustained development of those
egions where they are present’’.
.2. Ownership structures and regulator preferences
In terms of ownership structure, Spanish savings
anks can be divided into two groups. The first
ncludes those savings banks controlled by public
dministrations (henceforth, public SBs); that is,
hose savings banks in which the public administra
ions (PA) hold more than 50% of the votes in the
eneral meeting of the savings bank. To calculate
his, we add local, provincial and regional PAs,
long with public founders. The second group is
ormed by savings banks controlled by insiders
henceforth, insider SBs); that is, savings banks in
hich employees, depositors and private founders
ccount for 50% or more of the votes.2
1 Although not directly represented in the governing bodies, the
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Table 1
Mission and stakeholders for the Spanish savings banks
Mission goals Description Stakeholders
y1: Universal access to financial services Favor popular savings and avoid the exclusion from the
financial system
Founders
Public
Administrations
Employees
y2: Profit maximization Collect savings and make investments under safe and
profitable terms
Depositors
Bank of Spain
Employees
y3: Promote competition and prevent monopoly
abuse
Combat usury Founders
Public
Administrations
y4: Make a contribution to social welfare and wealth
distribution
Provide services of not-for-profit and charitable nature Founders
y5: Make a contribution to regional development Take notice of the genuine interests of the territory Public
AdministrationsVoting distribution among the stakeholders not
only implies differences in ownership structure, it
can also reveal the preferences of the regional admin
istrations on a bank’s goals, which by law have
competence to rule on the governing bodies’ compo
sition. In this matter, legislator preferences are
implicitly expressed through the voting distribution
among stakeholders in the general meeting.
In public SBs, when the legislator explicitly allo
cates more than 50% of the votes in the general
meeting to public administrations, the legislator is
showing a preference for the goals attached to this
group of stakeholders. As shown in Table 1, the
goals of universal access, competition enhancement
and regional development should be favored over
profit maximization and wealth redistribution.
On the other hand, if the legislator allocates the
control of savings banks to insiders, the order of
priorities will favor the goals attached to employees,
depositors and private founders. That is, the legisla
tor is showing a preference for profit maximization
and growth over other goals, as depicted in Table 1.
In insider SBs, the group formed by managers
and workers enjoy the control, due to the limited
ability of depositors the group that typically has
the largest percentage of votes to influence the
functioning of savings banks. There are at least
two reasons that support this fact: (1) depositors’
goals are already protected by means of a debt con
tract, deposit insurance and an exit option with low
costs. (2) The system of electing their representatives
(a lottery and a fixed period of time) along with the
limited power they hold (one delegate, one vote)ake it extremely difficult for this group to act in
coordinated way. In fact, managers exert a
markable influence on this group. Employees, on
e other hand, maintain a stable and lasting rela
on with the organization and, furthermore, they
ve quite homogeneous preferences. Therefore, it
ems reasonable to think that employees share
cision power with the managers, as both groups
ow a clear preference for the entity’s growth. Cer
inly, growth implies more reputation and power
r managers, along with salary improvements and
e possibility of becoming more independent in
eir decision making. For employees, growth
eans more opportunities for internal promotion
d wage increases. At the same time, both groups
so pursue the goal of profit maximization, needed
preserve their jobs and to justify wage increases.
ccording to this view, some rewards to workers
.g., generous salaries) are simple self entrench
ent strategies for incumbent CEOs to avoid their
placement (Pagano and Volpin, 2005).
Last but not least, the legal nature of savings
nks makes them more dependent on their ability
grow through the use of internal funds. Given
e above, we interpret that the allocation of control
insiders shows legislator preference for growth
d profit maximization.
Measuring savings banks’ performance with DEA
Here we describe the methodology used to ana
ze how different ownership structures contribute
the achievement of the goals included in the
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omission of Spanish savings banks. Data Envelop
ment Analysis (DEA) techniques turn out to be, in
our opinion, particularly relevant in this case for
three reasons. First, DEA does not try to estimate
the form of the production function, but it uses exist
ing observations to elaborate a non parametric
empirical frontier where the exact form of the func
tion that relates inputs and outputs is unknown.
Nevertheless the non parametric, statistical proper
ties of DEA estimators are well discussed in several
papers (Banker, 1993, 1996). By applying DEA, we
obtain an aggregate performance index for each SB
in comparison to the rest of observations. This index
measures the distance between a particular SB and
the frontier. Secondly, by means of a dual transfor
mation of the DEA maximization programs, it
becomes possible to assign weights to each of the
multiple goals. The only assumptions are that each
observation should be placed on the extreme frontier
or below it, and that the set of weights must be fea
sible for any of the sample observations. Finally,
these techniques offer the possibility of including a
priori information on the relative importance of
the variables (Golany, 1988; Thomson et al., 1990;
Roll and Golany, 1991; Allen et al., 1997; Halme
et al., 1999; Joro et al., 2003). More specifically, if
we restrict the weight values associated to the vari
ables, we will be able to calculate a new aggregate
performance index that takes into account a given
preference relation among goals. We now proceed
to analyze these three issues formally.3.1. Multiplicity of goals and DEA o
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ðWe focus on the agency relationship between the
different stakeholders and the bank’s management
team. The contract that regulates this relationship
establishes that the principal delegates to the man
agers of the bank i, i ¼ 1; . . . ; I , the task of trans
forming the n inputs, xi ¼ ðxi1; . . . ; xinÞ 2 Rnþ, into
the goals or outputs that stakeholders are interested
in, yi ¼ ðyi1; . . . ; yi5Þ 2 R5þ. If each savings bank uses
different quantities of these n inputs to obtain these
m outputs, we will construct the set of production
possibilities from the data
T ¼ ðx; yÞ : xP
XI
i 1
kixi; y 6
XI
i 1
kiyi;
(
XI
i 1
ki ¼ 1; ki P 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ; I
)
; ð1Þhich is the smallest set that includes all observations
nd satisfies the free input and output disposability
onditions. This set also fulfills convexity and the
onotonicity assumptions (Banker and Thrall,
992) and, furthermore, the technology described
n (1) exhibits variable returns to scale (VRS). We
houldmention that Spanish SBs differ widely in size,
perational activity, objectives and geographical
arket. All this leads us to favor a model with VRS.
Once the set of production possibilities T is
efined, we formulate the problem of measuring
Bs efficiency. We use an output oriented DEA
odel to analyze the effect that the governance char
cteristics of SBs exert on the fulfillment of their
ission. The implicit assumption here is that man
gement teams aim at maximizing output levels
i.e., the five goals) while keeping the input levels.
he optimization problem for a given SB ‘‘  ’’ can
e written as the following linear program, solved I
imes, once for each SB (Banker et al., 1984):
IPÞ 1 max h
XI
i 1
ki y
i
j P h
yj ;
XI
i 1
ki x
i
k 6 xk ;
(
XI
i 1
ki 1; k

i P 0; j 1; . . . ;m; k 1; . . . ; n
)
:
ð2Þ
The solution to (2), h P 1, represents the pro
ortion by which the five outputs or goals of the ana
yzed SB must be increased to move a given bank to
he production possibilities frontier (i.e. the frontier
f good practices). Therefore, a bank will be efficient
nly if h ¼ 1. The inverse of this value is an aggre
ate index of performance, IP, the value of which
uantifies, in relative terms, how well managers use
he inputs to obtain the maximum level of outputs
or stakeholders. Consequently, ð1 IPÞ measures
he degree of inefficiency. Non negative values of k
dentify the reference set for the evaluated SB; i.e.,
he set of banks that define the section of the frontier
here that SB is projected. For those cases in which
SB is located on the frontier, we will have k ¼ 1
nd ki ¼ 0.
Let us consider now the dual form corresponding
o program (2):
IPÞ 1 ¼ min
Xn
k 1
vkx

k þ /

Xm
j 1
lj y

j ¼ 1;
Xn
k 1
vkx
i
k
(
Xm
j 1
lj y
i
j þ / P 0; vk ; lj P 0;/free;i ¼ 1; . . . ; I
)
:
ð3Þ
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IPProgram (3) is solved I times as well, and it
allows us to simultaneously identify /, which is a
measure of the possible existence of economies of
scale, and the optimal output and input weights
(or multipliers) for each SB, denoted by lj and v

k
respectively. In doing so, we assume that with the
set of weights of the evaluated SB no other entity
obtains a value for IP over 1 (the point of
maximum efficiency corresponding to the frontier).
Moreover, the duality theorem guarantees that
solutions to programs (2) and (3) become identical.
The weights that solve program (3) represent
each SB’s achievement of goals (Caporaletti et al.,
1999), and there is no other weight combination
that, given the possibilities of transformation of this
technology, provides a higher performance index
(Allen et al., 1997) for the evaluated SB. Therefore,
we interpret these weights as a measurement of the
relative importance that a given SB confers on its
goals. Such weights will be the result of private
negotiations between the different stakeholders.
Next, we modify program (3) so that we can
incorporate legislator preferences. Thus, we con
struct a second performance index to evaluate the
managers’ performance in terms of the a priori
order of priorities. By comparing both indexes
we can identify and measure how accurate the
managers’ interpretation of the legislator prefer
ences is.
3.2. Legislator preferences and DEA
The inclusion of legislator preferences into pro
gram (3) imposes additional restrictions on weights.
Provided that these weights represent the relative
importance of each goal, legislator preferences are
expressed in the form of a given arrangement of
the goals included in the mission. Therefore, the
additional restrictions to program (3) could be writ
ten in terms of marginal rates of transformation
(Thomson et al., 1990) or by means of an ordinal
relation among the weights (Golany, 1988):
lis 6 lir 6 lit; ð4Þ
where ðr; s; tÞ denote outputs. An interesting advan
tage of doing so is that we only need to arrange the
weights according to legislator preferences, that is,
there is no need to establish the lower or the upper
limit. Such a feature is particularly relevant here
where the information concerning the composition
of the general meeting only allows us to arrange
the goals.According to Section 2, when the legislator allo
tes control to the public administrations, prefer
ces favor the goals of universal access (y1),
mpetition enhancement (y3) and regional develop
ent (y5). Without further additional information
arrange priorities, we can represent such prefer
ces in the following way:
1; l3; l5 P l2; l4: ð5Þ
Similarly, the legislator’s preference for those
als associated with insiders, that is, universal ser
ce (y1) and profit maximization (y2) could be
pressed with another set of additional constraints
n weights:
1; l2 P l3; l4; l5: ð6Þ
DEA techniques contemplate the inclusion of
strictions on weights, like Eqs. (5) and (6) into
rogram (3), and as a result we obtain a value,
RR 2 ½0; 1 (where R stands for restricted), which
our second performance index. IPR indicates
e ability to produce, given the transformation pos
bilities of the technology and the preferences of the
social planner’’, the highest levels of outputs
i
1; . . . ; y
i
5Þ from the fixed endowments of inputs
i
1; . . . ; x
i
nÞ. With this new index, we can measure
e contribution of a bank’s managers to welfare
aximization. Thus, ð1 IPRÞ indicates the dis
nce between the current decisions and the legisla
r’s good practice frontier.
Obviously, adding constraints implies a decrease
the performance index, unless the managerial
ecisions respect the legislator priorities on goals.
herefore, 1P IP P IPR. Moreover, by com
aring these two indexes we can calculate a third,
amely, allocative efficiency (AE):
E ¼ IPR

IP
6 1: ð7Þ
This AE index enables us to evaluate how accu
tely a manager has implemented the principal’s
irectives at the time of taking decisions. If manag
s do respect legislator priorities, the IP perfor
ance index, and the one using restrictions on
eights, IPR, will be equivalent and allocative
efficiency will not occur, (i.e., AE ¼ 1Þ. In general,
ne can always decompose the global performance
dex into the initial performance and the allocative
ciency,
R ¼ IP  AE: ð8Þ
7
tIn the following section we show an application
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5 These authors measure rivalry among SBs in geographical
markets but they do not consider the intra-regional distributionsavings banks.
4. Data and variable description
The data used in this paper is extracted from the
Statistical Yearbook of the Confederation of Sav
ings Banks (published by the Spanish Confederation
of Savings Banks). We complement this data with
three additional sources: the Economic Bulletin of
the Bank of Spain, the Green Book of Financial
Institutions and individual annual reports. The
empirical application covers the period 1998 2002,
and we construct a pool of all the savings banks
contained in the Record of Entities of the Bank of
Spain. Thus, the total number of SBs in our sample
is of 50, 49, 47, 46 and 46 in the years 1998, 1999,
2000, 2001 and 2002, respectively.3 The decision to
pool the data is explained by the proportion of the
number of annual observations with respect to the
number of variables used. Dyson et al. (2001)
described a rule of thumb for a DEA model to
achieve a reasonable level of discrimination between
efficient and inefficient observations. Such condition
is not satisfied here for all the annual data and,
therefore, we decided to pool the data.
Our sample includes 226 observations (savings
bank year). We exclude four observations from
the initial sample (238) due to missing data.4
Besides, and as a prior step to the estimation of per
formance, we analyze the presence of outliers. As is
well known, the analysis of efficiency with determin
istic DEA models is quite sensitive to the presence
of outliers in the sample. This is due to the fact that
the frontier could be determined by observations
that are extreme points, and this might affect the
efficiency evaluation for the rest of entities. In order
to overcome these problems, we applied Wilson’s
(1995) proposal to deal with extreme observations.
After this, we exclude eight additional observations
from the sample: Municipal de Burgos (all years),
Municipal de Vigo (year 1998), Pollensa (year
1999) and Manresa (year 2000).
The next step in modeling SBs efficiency is the
specification of inputs and outputs of the produc
3 Three take-over mergers have taken place during this period.
In 1999, Vigo SB took over Ourense SB, and in the year 2000, it
took over Pontevedra SB. The same year Pamplona SB was taken
over by Navarra SB.
4 These exclusions are the Balearics and Carlet SBs.
o
c
pion process. A survey of the different conceptual
pproaches can be found in Berger and Humphrey
1997). Here, we follow the production approach,
ince it deals with our main objective: to explain
ow closely a SB moves toward its multiple goals.
he analysis focuses on service production and the
takeholders’ objectives attained by each SB. More
pecifically, service production requires the con
umption of physical and material inputs, as well
s human resources. Consequently, we select three
nputs closely related to these three resources: staff,
he use of capital in terms of depreciation, and the
se of other inputs.
Furthermore, we select five outputs that repre
ent the goals included in the banks’ mission. The
rst goal consists in providing universal access to
nancial services, that is, the promotion of savings
mong the popular classes, preventing their exclu
ion from the financial system and trying, at the
ame time, to move these services closer to all citi
ens and locations in the territory. We evaluate
he contribution of a financial institution to the pre
ention of social exclusion (or lack of banking activ
ty) through a territorial dimension the proportion
f branches in villages and small towns and
hrough the offering of financial services to custom
rs with low levels of resources, or small balances.
ccordingly, we use two proxies for this goal. The
rst is the proportion of branches outside the pro
incial capital, which is measured by a Herfindahl
ype index (Fuentelsaz et al., 2002).5 High values
f this index mean that SBs locate their branches
n small towns. The second is the inverse of the aver
ge balance of deposits (ABD), calculated as the
atio of the total volume of deposits to the number
f current accounts, saving accounts and deposit
ccounts. Low values of the ABD ratio imply that
he bank is rendering financial services to clients
ith low incomes (i.e., customers that generate a
igh cost per unit of deposit).
The second goal is profit maximization, that is,
he use of savings to obtain high profits and avoid,
t the same time, bankruptcies or insolvencies.
afety improves with the level of reserves, which
hemselves are an increasing function of the savingsf branches. We think that the ratio of branches outside the
apital over the total number of branches captures the idea of
roximity to customers more accurately.
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Table 2
Average input and output levels
Average 1998 2002 Full sample Insider SBs Public SBs
Inputs Employees expenditure 105,951a 150,225 77,190
Operating expenses 49,946a 69,928 36,965
Depreciation expenses 18,909a 29,912 11,760
Outputs Average balance of deposits 6.0627a 5.4887 6.4357
Herfindahl index 0.2644 0.2882 0.2490
Profits after taxes 69,675a 92,663 54,741
Interest rates for overdrafts 21.6859 21.4288 21.8529
Charitable-social programs 19,284a 26,353 14693
Loans to public administrations 261,345a 369,398 191,150
Number of observations 226 89 137
Notes: (a) Average values expressed in thousands of €. (b) Average values expressed in thousands of €/account. (c) Average value between
0 and 1. (d) Average value expressed in percentage.
a Significant differences at a 5% level (ANOVA) within the two control models (insiders and public).bank’s profits. Therefore, we use the variable profit
after taxes to measure this second goal.
Competition enhancement and avoidance of
monopoly abuse is the third goal included in the
mission of savings banks. To obtain better condi
tions and lower prices for customers would be the
updated version of combating usury, the traditional
goal. The contribution of savings banks to competi
tion enhancement within the Spanish banking sector
should be seen in the use of competitive prices; i.e.,
prices closer to marginal costs.6 Because the public
accounts of SBs are not sufficiently detailed, we
have not considered the possibility of approaching
prices through the average interest rate in the data
on Assets and Liabilities. Nevertheless, the Bank
of Spain publishes the (non regulated) interest rates
applied by financial institutions to their clients:
prime rates, interest rates on overdrafts in checking
accounts and interest rates for exceeding the limit.
To measure the difference between price and mar
ginal cost in this case, we use the interest rate for
overdrafts as an indicator of price. We rely on the
fact that the people that pay such a price are pre
cisely those with less bargaining power (as opposed
to what happens with the prime interest rate) and,
consequently, the SB has leeway to exercise its
6 When firms compete in a non-differentiated market a´ lath
re
m
ex
w
Cournot, profit maximization requires satisfying the condition:
(pi ci,) (piÞ 1 ¼ Si jepj 1; where pi, ci, Si, ep denote price,
marginal cost, market share, and price-elasticity for the firm i,
respectively. Solving for market share and dividing by the firm j 0s
market share, it follows that the ratio of market shares should be
equal to the ratio of margins.onopoly power on them. On the other hand, we
e the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks
ference on interest rates for assets published on
ecember 31 of each year as an approach to mar
nal cost. Since the difference between price and
arginal cost becomes a measure of market power,
e use the inverse of that difference in our empirical
plication as a proxy of the SBs’ contribution to
ompetition enhancement’’. Thus, the indicator is
e inverse of the difference between the interest rate
r overdrafts and the reference interest for assets.
The fourth goal is the contribution to wealth dis
ibution and welfare, measured by the amount of
sources that SBs spend on ‘‘obra social’’, that is,
rvices with a charitable or social character.
Finally, the contribution to regional development
uld be understood as the provision of funds that
nerate social externalities that the private sector
es not provide. This lack of interest on the part
the private sector could be compensated by the
gional administrations. Thus, we calculate the
oportion of loans (in euros) granted to the Public
dministrations over the total volume of loans.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics. One
portant methodological issue in this approach is
e use of multiple variables expressed in different
its, percentages or indexes. This fact increases
e difficulties of estimating performance indexes.
oreover, the measuring approach will also affect
e calculation of weights and restrictions that rep
sent legislator preferences. Following the recom
endations found in Dyson et al. (2001), we first
press all variables in percentages and, later on,
e standardize each variable.
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t5. Empirical results
5.1. Aggregate performance indexes under a common
frontier
Table 3 contains the summary statistics for the
aggregate performance indexes calculated using
the pooled frontier. In order to evaluate the man
agement of SBs, the performance index that incor
porates the preferences revealed by the legislator
(IPR) provides us with a measurement of the over
all efficiency attained by the bank. The IPR reflects
differences both in goal achievement (performance
index, IP) and optimalization of goal mix (alloca
tive efficiency, AE). According to the figures in
Table 3, insider SBs exhibited higher performance
indexes than public SBs in every efficiency measure.
The differences observed in performance indexes for
the insider SBs and the public SBs are all statisti
cally significant, suggesting that insider SBs oper
ated closer to the pooled frontier than public SBs
did.
In particular, the average IPR for the insider
banks is 82.76% and 75.45% for public SBs. These
results indicate that those banks controlled by insid
ers could increase their outputs or the level of their
mission’s goals by 17.24%, on average, while keep
ing their current consumption of inputs constant.
This figure expresses the level of overall inefficiencyTable 3
Aggregate performance indexes: common frontier
Inside
PANEL A: summary statistics for performance indexes
IPR
Mean (standard deviation) 82.76%
# SBs on the frontier 17
IP
Mean (standard deviation) 84.04%
# SBs on the frontier 24
AE
Mean (standard deviation) 98.53%
# SBs on the frontier 38
ANOVA
F (Prob > F)
PANEL B: statistical tests of equality of performance indexes between in
IPR 10.840 (0.001)
IP 3.402 (0.066)
AE 37.329 (0.000)
Notes: IPR: performance index with preferences revealed by the legisla
among stakeholders. AE: allocative efficiency. The null hypotheses ar
distribution (Kruskal Wallis) and the median (Wilcoxon) of the performf insider SBs. For those SBs controlled by public
dministrations, inefficiency increases to 24.55%.
n order to better explain the reasons for these num
ers, we break down the IPR index into two: the
erformance index without restrictions (IP) and
he allocative efficiency (AE). As shown in Table
, a larger proportion of the overall inefficiency in
he SBs seems to obey poor IP ratios and, to a lesser
xtent, problems related to allocative efficiency. We
bserve that insider SBs are more efficient than pub
ic SBs when we maximize the mission without
mposing restrictions on weights. More specifically,
nsider SBs reach an IP of 84.04%, while the aggre
ate performance index drops to 79.94% in the case
f public SBs. Concerning AE, efficiency reaches
8.53% when insiders have control, in contrast to
4.38% for public SBs.
Two main conclusions follow. First, managers
espect the priority order defined by the legislator
n both types of SBs; the AE index attains values
lose to 100% in both groups. Accordingly, the
verall inefficiency (IPR) of savings banks can be
xplained, mainly, in terms of technical inefficiency
IP). Second, according to the IP figures insider
Bs perform better than public SBs. This better per
ormance of the insider SBs is mainly due to their
anagers’ ability to use productive resources and
mprove their stakeholders’ goals more efficiently
han public SB managers.r SBs Public SBs
(15.46%) 75.45% (16.78%)
17
(15.75%) 79.94% (16.66%)
28
(2.83%) 94.38% (5.98%)
28
Kruskal Wallis Wilcoxon
x (Prob > x) Z (Prob > Z)
sider SBs and public SBs
11.088 (0.001) 3.330 (0.001)
3.825 (0.051) 1.956 (0.051)
36.102 (0.000) 6.009 (0.000)
tor. IP: performance index as the result of private negotiations
e that the average of the sample (ANOVA), the functions of
ance indexes for the insider SBs and public SBs are equal.
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Table 4
Statistical test of equal technologies between insider and public
savings banks
ANOVA Kruskal Wallis Wilcoxon
F (Prob > F) x (Prob > x) Z (Prob > Z)
IPR 23.620 (0.000) 25.395 (0.000) 12.131 (0.000)
IP 13.502 (0.000) 12.663 (0.000) 11.177 (0.000)
AE 34.404 (0.000) 31.693 (0.001) 8.678 (0.000)
Notes: IPR: performance index with preferences revealed by the
legislator. IP: performance index without restrictions. AE: allo-
cative efficiency. The null hypotheses are that the average of the
sample (ANOVA), the functions of distribution (Kruskal Wallis)
and the median (Wilcoxon) of the performance indexes for the
pooled frontier and the group-specific frontiers are equal.5.2. Aggregate performance indexes under
differentiated frontiers
The presence of different ownership forms raises
an important issue: we must decide whether to com
pute efficiency by means of a single frontier that
includes all savings banks or, alternatively, a differ
ent frontier for each bank type. The above results,
based on the use of a common frontier, would turn
out to be inaccurate if the hypothesis of identical
frontiers failed to be sustained. As Altunbas et al.
(2001) have already pointed out, two frontiers will
be more appropriate if each ownership type pursues
different objectives, since in doing so technology dif
ferences will be controlled for. Moreover, Mester
(1993), who estimated a separate (cost) frontier for
each ownership type, argued that results obtained
under a common frontier confound technology
choice and inefficiency. Nevertheless, researchers
have rarely recognized the effect of technology
choice on efficiency, and few scholars (Cebenoyan
et al., 1993; Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1992) have
tested the underlying technologies in their samples.
When no significant differences are found, the use
of a common frontier seems adequate; otherwise
comparing efficiency values obtained from a single
frontier becomes inappropriate. To test the hypoth
esis of identical frontiers (technologies) for insider
and public SBs, we apply a two stage test already
used in the DEA literature (Elyasiani and Mehdian,
1992). In a first stage, performance indexes are eval
uated for the joint sample, assuming they share a
common technology. In the second stage, these
indexes are calculated for each subsample, assuming
the presence of different technologies. Under the
null hypothesis, the ordering of SBs on the basis
of their performance indexes for the joint sample
turns out to be the same as that of calculating per
formance indexes separately for each subsample.
Then, if the null hypothesis cannot be accepted, as
is the case, we must evaluate the managers after
controlling for technology.
Table 4 shows the results of the test and suggests
that the average of the sample (ANOVA), the distri
bution functions (Kruskal Wallis) and the median
(Wilcoxon) of the performance indexes in the com
bined sample and the separate samples are statisti
cally different, at a 5% significance level.
Therefore, we must assume the use of different tech
nologies for each type. Furthermore, this result is
independent of the performance index chosen for
the test.Following Elyasiani and Mehdian (1992), we can
so justify this technological difference between the
o groups of SBs by the idiosyncratic characteris
cs of each organizational model, either in terms
f its productive specialization or its organizational
aracteristics. Regarding product specialization,
e descriptive statistics shown in Table 2 indicate
at public SBs are smaller in size. This could
plain why these entities are more present in less
mpetitive regional markets (where they can offer
rvices at higher rates of interest). On the other
and, insider SBs are much larger in size and, pre
ictably, they participate in more competitive mar
ets where they must also face commercial banks
competitors. Savings banks of such relevance as
Caixa d’Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona’’ or ‘‘Caja
adrid’’ (ranked as No. 56 and No. 98, respec
vely, in the The Banker 2003 Top 1000 World
ank ranking) belong to this group. Both their size
d the intensity of competition in the markets in
hich they operate certainly demand more sophisti
ted management and, consequently, more quali
ed managers as well. Moreover, these firms
hieve higher levels of efficiency.
Regarding organizational characteristics, we can
so say that ownership structure seems to have an
ect on SB efficiency. More specifically, those SBs
ith an ownership structure that allocates a major
y of control rights to PA have lower performance
dexes. This indicates that a significant presence of
A inside the governing bodies excessively politi
zes the firm, hindering decision making and exert
g, eventually, a negative effect on efficiency.
For the rest of the paper, we evaluate the man
ement practices of SBs after controlling for tech
ology. The common frontier results could still be
f certain interest, even when the null hypothesis
11
t
1
l
c
h
i
a
r
o
a
o
3
v
o
m
T
i
u
f
t
m
c
Table 5
Aggregate performance indexes: Group-specific frontiers
Insider SBs Public SBs
PANEL A: summary statistics for performance indexes
IPR
Mean (standard deviation) 89.90% (11.61%) 83.53% (15.73%)
# SBs on the frontier 29 45
IP
Mean (standard deviation) 90.32% (11.60%) 85.09% (15.39%)
# SBs on the frontier 31 49
AE
Mean (standard deviation) 99.53% (0.92%) 98.09% (3.06%)
# SBs on the frontier 59 72
ANOVA Kruskal Wallis Wilcoxon
F (Prob > F) x (Prob > x) Z (Prob > Z)
PANEL B: statistical tests of equality of performance indexes between insider SBs and public SBs
IPR 10.761 (0.001) 6.088 (0.014) 2.467 (0.014)
IP 7,507 (0.007) 3.410 (0.065) 1.847 (0.065)
AE 18.458 (0.000) 10.681 (0.001) 3.268 (0.001)
Notes: IPR: performance index with preferences revealed by the legislator. IP: performance index as the result of private negotiations
among stakeholders. AE: allocative efficiency. The null hypotheses are that the average of the sample (ANOVA), the functions of
distribution (Kruskal Wallis) and the median (Wilcoxon) of the performance indexes for the insider SBs and public SBs are equal.
c
SBs remain practically the same: 94.5% for public SBs and 97.4%
in the case of insider SBs.
12of identical technologies has been rejected. In partic
ular, the findings under a pooled frontier will rein
force and strengthen the results obtained from the
group specific frontier if both evaluations are con
sistent (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1992, 1995). That
being said, the reported efficiency values can differ
substantially between both estimation procedures
(as it can be seen by comparing Tables 3 and 5)
because group specific frontiers envelope the data
more closely.
In order to evaluate the management of SBs, the
performance index that incorporates the preferences
revealed by the legislator, IPR, measures the overall
efficiency attained by the bank. Due to the construc
tion of this model, all SBs now fulfill the externally
imposed restrictions. Thus, we evaluate manage
ment in an agency framework that specifies the
goals to be reached and the order of preference
among them. The results in Table 5 indicate that
IPR is higher, on average, for the subsample of insi
der SBs, showing that they are, on average, more
efficient in relation to their own frontier than public
SBs. The insider subsample frontier is formed by
those entities that, after ‘‘exhausting’’ the transfor
mation possibilities their own technology offers, still
respect the order of priorities defined ex ante by the
legislator. A total of 29 SBs form this frontier,
almost 32.58% of the subsample. Furthermore, the
distance between the remaining SBs and this fronier, that is, total inefficiency, can be quantified in
0.10%. The performance index of public SBs is
ower, 85.53%. In other words, their average ineffi
iency amounts to 14.47%.7
Table 5 also shows the results of the analysis on
ow well the SBs maximize their mission when leg
slator preferences are not taken into account, the
bove mentioned performance index (IP). As these
esults show, when we maximize the mission with
ut imposing restrictions on weights; i.e., when we
pply programs (2) or (3) to each subsample, we
bserve that 31 entities lie on the frontier, or
4.83% of the group, reaching an IP of 90.32%. This
alue indicates that, with the current consumption
f inputs, the outputs represent 90% of the transfor
ation possibilities that the technology offers.
herefore, to reach the frontier, insider SBs should
ncrease all their outputs by 10% on average, a fig
re that represents average inefficiency.
In the case of public SBs, 39 entities lie on the
rontier and the aggregate performance index drops
o 85.09%. From these results, we can state that the
anagement of insider SBs attains results which are
loser to their group’s frontier of good practice. In
7 We have assumed a VRS DEA model. We have also tested the
ase of constant returns to scale and the efficiency levels for all
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wother words, they are more efficient than public SBs,
if we define efficiency as the managers’ ability to
reach their goals with the productive resources given
and the preferences on goals determined by negoti
ation among the stakeholders.
Furthermore, we also evaluate the managers on
two lines: their skill in transforming inputs into
stakeholders’ goals and their ability to implement
legislator preferences. For this, we have calculated
the allocative efficiency (AE), as described in Eq.
(7). From the results shown in Table 5, one can
see that AE reaches values close to 100% in both
groups. In particular, when insiders have control,
AE is 99.53 and rises to 98.09% when SBs are con
trolled by a PA. It is interesting to highlight that,
despite the moderate decrease in the number of
SBs placed on the respective frontiers, the number
of allocative efficient SBs increases considerably
(66.29% for insiders and 52.55% for PA), once we
include legislator preferences.
Managers seem to identify quite accurately the
legislator’s preferences as revealed in the composiTable 6
Goals relative weights: Group-specific frontiers
PANEL A: summary statistics for goals relative weights
With restrictions (IPR) (a) l1
l2
l3
l4
l5
Without restrictions (IP) (b) l1
l2
l3
l4
l5
ANOVA
F (Prob > F)
PANEL B: statistical tests of equality of goals relative weights between ins
With restrictions (IPR) (a) l1 8.601 (0.00
l2 191.413 (0.00
l3 43.412 (0.00
l4 2.282 (0.13
l5 49.472 (0.00
Without restrictions (IP) (b) l1 6.681 (0.01
l2 66.655 (0.00
l3 6.126 (0.01
l4 2.264 (0.13
l5 26.666 (0.00
Notes: (a) Weights are obtained by applying the program (3) first to public
adding restrictions (6) to program (3). (b) Weights are obtained by apply
The null hypotheses are that the average of the sample (ANOVA), th
(Wilcoxon) of the goal weights are equal for insider SBs and public SBs.on of governing bodies. Similarly, if we assume
at managerial decisions are the result of negotia
on between various different groups, and final
cisions are taken according to given corporate
vernance rules and stakeholders’ power, our
sults indicate that there is no difference between
e formal allocation of control (through voting dis
ibution) and the real control eventually exercised
each group. So, in practice, from the negotiation
ocess between stakeholders one obtains an order
preferences not so different from the preferences
fined ex ante by the legislator. Consequently,
e differences in performance between both types
savings banks will be better explained by the
anagers’ ability to use their productive resources
a more efficient way and reach the goals pursued
the stakeholders. In other words, the difference
served in the IPR index does not respond so
uch to a problem of interpretation of the legisla
r’s preferences (allocative efficiency), as to a prob
m in goals implementation (performance index
ithout restrictions, IP). Furthermore, these resultsInsider SBs Public SBs
0.8152 1.0866
1.1922 0.1407
0.0844 0.5104
0.1403 0.1869
0.1188 0.945
0.6658 0.9224
1.053 0.2693
0.1467 0.316
0.2028 0.2806
0.2099 0.8966
Kruskal Wallis Wilcoxon
x (Prob > x) Z (Prob > Z)
ider SBs and public SBs
4) 9.638 (0.002) 3.105 (0.002)
0) 108.136 (0.000) 10.399 (0.000)
0) 56.645 (0.000) 7.526 (0.000)
2) 3.476 (0.062) 1.865 (0.062)
0) 95.272 (0.000) 9.761 (0.000)
0) 6.917 (0.009) 2.630 (0.009)
0) 27.704 (0.000) 5.263 (0.000)
4) 1.046 (0.307) 1.023 (0.307)
4) 2.800 (0.094) 1.673 (0.094)
0) 32.000 (0.000) 5.657 (0.000)
SBs, and then adding restrictions (5). Similarly for insider SBs,
ing the program (3) to each SBs subsample.
e functions of distribution (Kruskal Wallis) and the median
13
a
IPR performance of savings banks as we mention
later in the section of conclusions.
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14are independent of the frontier, and after control
ling for technology we can now attribute the lack
of efficiency in a particular type of SB to its
managers.
5.3. Priorities and control types
After verifying that allocative inefficiency turns
out to be very low, we focus on the identification
of the mission’s structure. That is, we want to deter
mine the relative importance of each goal as the
result of private negotiation among stakeholders.
Later, we compare this with the preference order
defined ex ante by the legislator.
The weights attached to each goal are obtained
from the application of the dual program (3) to
the two subsamples. According to the results shown
in Table 6, the goals that receive more attention in
insider controlled SBs are profit maximization (l2)
and universal financial service (l1), while enhancing
competition (l3) and regional development (l5) are
poorly valued. These results corroborate the initial
intuition that the allocation of control rights to
insiders has consequences on the choice of goals
finally implemented, confirmed by their emphasis
on growth and the search for higher levels of profits.
As far as public SBs are concerned, universal
financial service (l1) and regional development
(l5) are the goals that receive larger weights. Com
petition enhancement (l3) is the goal placed in third
position, although the pairwise comparisons
between this weight and those attached to profit
maximization (l2) and contribution to social wel
fare (l4) are statistically insignificant (Wilcoxon
test). It is also worth emphasizing that the last goal
forpublic SBs, in terms of relative importance, is
profit maximization (l2).
Although not reported here, we have also run
this analysis with differences in bank size and the
main results remain unchanged. Nevertheless, as
size increases, the economic goal gains in impor
tance inside the objective function of insider SBs.
In fact, it becomes the only goal for SBs in the
fourth quartile (i.e., for very large banks, economic
performance receives a much larger weight com
pared to other goals).
Due to the characteristics of the optimization
program, both groups of savings banks respect the
priority relation entrusted to them by the legislator
(defined in Eqs. (5) and (6)). Nevertheless, the infor
mation obtained by comparing weights before and
after the use of constraints is far from irrelevantnd it suggests possible ways for improving the. Sensitivity analyses
We conducted three additional analyses to check
he robustness of the above results. These results
onfirm the main conclusions of the paper. Now,
e briefly summarize the motivation for and the
ain findings of these analyses.8
We first checked the influence of weight multi
licity. As is widely known, DEA constructs a piece
ise linear surface, implying that, for each efficient
rm (i.e., an observation that defines a vertex of
he enveloping frontier there is not just one but a
ultiple number of weights that could be used (see
osen et al., 1998). Note, however, that the problem
f weight multiplicity is not applicable to inefficient
bservations: the optimal weights for inefficient
bservations are unique and these weights are deter
ined by the slope of the frontier where they are
rojected). Therefore, if the average results pre
ented in Table 6, for weights without restrictions,
ere calculated for inefficient firms only, goal prior
ties would be exactly the same for the two types of
Bs.
Additionally, in an attempt to assess whether our
esults are sensitive to other sets of optimal weights,
e used optimization programs aimed at computing
pper and lower bounds for output weights. More
pecifically, we used a procedure defined by Banker
nd Thrall (1992, pp. 81 82). This procedure con
ists of replacing the objective function of the pro
ram (3) by Maxlj (to compute maximum
eights) or Minlj (to compute the minimum) and
dding the constraint
P
kv

kx

k þ / ¼ IP to the
onstraints included in (3). After applying these pro
rams, we found that the weights shown in Table 6
elong to the interval of possible values for each
eight interval defined by the maximum and mini
um weights. Additionally, this new application
howed that the relative importance of each goal,
dentified through upper and lower bounds on mul
ipliers, was consistent with the results discussed in
ection 5.3. Specifically, the results showed that
nsider SBs give priority to the goals of profit max
mization (l2) and universal financial service (l1).
8 These tests were pointed out by two anonymous referees. Full
esults are available upon request.
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puConcerning the public SBs, universal financial ser
vice (l1), regional development (l5) and competition
enhancement (l3) receive larger weights.
Second, we analyzed the relationship between
input/output measures and weights. One concern,
already pointed out by Sarrico and Dyson (2004)
and Dyson et al. (2001), is the dependence of abso
lute weights (those obtained from applying program
(3)) on the units of measurement of the input/output
data set. Their recommendation is to compute vir
tual input/outputs, that is, the product of the input
(output) level and the optimal weight for that input
(output). Proceeding in this way, virtual variables
become dimensionless and the results are easier to
interpret. We followed their recommendation and
the results were again highly consistent with those
ones reported in Section 5. The results from the
model without restrictions indicate that the goals
that receive more attention in insider SBs are profit
maximization (l2  y2 ¼ 0:41Þ and universal finan
cial service (l1  y1 ¼ 0:34Þ; while enhancing com
petition (l3  y3 ¼ 0:06Þ, contribution to social
welfare (l4  y4 ¼ 0:09Þ and regional development
(l5  y5 ¼ 0:09Þ obtain low values. Similarly, uni
versal financial service (l1  y1 ¼ 0:37Þ and regional
development (l5  y5 ¼ 0:26Þ become the goals that
receive larger weights in public SBs. Only the com
petition enhancement goal (l3  y3 ¼ 0:10Þ, for
public SBs, is ranked lower in terms of virtual goals
(profit maximization, l2  y2 ¼ 0:14, and contribu
tion to social welfare, l4  y4 ¼ 0:13Þ, but these dif
ferences are statistically insignificant (Wilcoxon
test). This is not such a surprising result if we note
the small distance (also statistically insignificant,
Wilcoxon test) between its absolute weight value
(l3 ¼ 0:32Þ and the weights for profit maximization
(l2 ¼ 0:27Þ and contribution to social welfare
(l4 ¼ 0:28Þ.
Finally, we studied in further detail the time evo
lution of the results when performing two kinds of
analyses. The fist analysis consists of measuring
the productivity change over time by means of
Malmquist indexes. As discussed in Camanho and
Dyson (2006), this index performs comparisons rel
ative to year specific frontiers only, without pooling
the observations to form a common frontier for all
years. In turn, this index can be broken down into
two components: one measuring the catching up
effect (efficiency change) and the other one captur
ing the shift in the production frontier (technical
change). The latter value is critical because only
when the annual frontiers share the same technoly can the yearly data be pooled and, therefore,
ay the efficiency scores be estimated relative to a
oled frontier. The results show modest changes
productivity during the period 1998 2002. The
chnical change values are close to one in both
b samples (insider and public SBs). This indicates
at the best practice frontier has remained immo
le, suggesting that the use of a pooled frontier
ith all years is a plausible solution and, further
ore, its use in our application has not biased the
sults. Starting from this evidence, we also calcu
ted the descriptive statistics for efficiency scores
d weights of each year in our sample, making
e of the group specific frontiers with pooled data.
he results of these analyses reveal several facts.
irst, the goal priorities are stable for each sub sam
e across years and are also consistent with the
sults shown in Table 6. Second, the frontiers show
w stability, particularly in the insider SBs sub
mple: 14 different firms (out of 22) have belonged
at least one year to the efficient set (18 of 30, in
e public SBs sub sample). Comparing both sub
mples, regularity is higher in the public group,
five savings banks define the frontier in all years.
hird, untabulated results for the evolution of effi
ency show a decreasing trend in efficiency scores.
his result is independent of the indicator of perfor
ance employed (IPR or IP) and the sub sample
alyzed (public or insider SBs). We conjecture
at this result can be explained by the increasing
essure placed on SBs to operate like commer
al banks pressure that leads SBs to focus more
the efficiency of their brokerage activities, pro
essively avoiding some activities that revert
ck to society (and penalizing their IPR and IP
ores).
Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the connec
ns between regulation, ownership structure and
e economic behavior of organizations. We have
so argued that the Spanish savings bank (SBs)
dustry may be an interesting case study for clarify
g these relationships. There are several distinctive
atures that make these banks interesting. Firstly,
ey pursue a wide mission that explicitly mentions
veral goals. Secondly, SBs are unlisted and have
ownership structure where different stakeholders
ke part. In this sense, current European legislation
stinguishes between savings banks controlled by
blic administrations and savings banks controlled
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yby insiders. And thirdly, the legislator occasionally
interferes in the SBs’ decision taking, trying to
impose their own preferences through specific regu
lation on the composition of governing bodies.
Clearly, some of these features are also present in
other organizational forms such as publicly owned
firms, mutual firms and other non profit organi
zations.
Taking these elements into account, we have
made use of several data envelopment analysis
(DEA) models to assess in the first instance
the effect of ownership differences on the SBs’ ability
to transform inputs into corporate goals. Then, we
have examined whether the legislator has succeeded
in imposing its preferences inside the organization.
By applying DEA to our data, we have built up
three performance indexes: technical efficiency,
overall efficiency and allocative efficiency indexes.
Using these indexes, SBs managers have been eval
uated on the basis of their ability to conform to leg
islator priorities (i.e. allocative efficiency), and their
efficient use of resources to reach the firm’s goals
(i.e. technical efficiency). Additionally, we have used
DEA to obtain the weights attached to the goals.
These weights must be interpreted as the relative
importance assigned to each goal and, as such, they
are the outcome of negotiations among stakeholders
after taking into account some previously defined
governance rules and the specific allocation of con
trol rights. Weight comparisons also become possi
ble in our analysis because each variable has been
previously standardized.
Our results show that the differences in the over
all efficiency of banks are not so much explained by
managers’ mistakes in interpreting the current legis
lation (allocative inefficiency is practically nonexis
tent), as by the presence of substantial differences
in the managers’ skills in transforming inputs into
goals for stakeholders (technical efficiency). These
results suggest that banks’ prioritization of goals
seems to be coherent, in principle, with legislator
preferences. More specifically, we have verified
how the voting distribution (established by the leg
islator) in savings banks’ general meetings has an
effect on the goals to be reached and, furthermore,
follows the direction pursued by the legislator.
Thus, the goals of regional development and univer
sal financial services receive more attention when
public administrations hold a majority of seats on
the governing bodies, whereas the attainment of
economic growth and higher profits are the favored
goals when insiders hold control.The main conclusion to be reached from this
esearch is that differences in the ownership structure
ive rise to differences in SBs technology and their
riorities, including the importance attached to
rofit maximization. This is why we hold that sav
ngs banks, in particular, and other multi objective
rganizations in general, should not be evaluated
xclusively in terms of profits (or costs), since they
ursue multiple and different goals which, presum
bly, they would not carry out if their ownership
tructure or their goal priorities were different. Fol
owing this argument, it does not seem reasonable
o evaluate managers in these organizations by their
conomic results alone, especially when the legislator
for example, by regulating the composition of gov
rning bodies) affects the technological possibilities
f the savings bank and encourages managers to
ursue different goals, which might even be in con
radiction with profit maximization.
Moreover, in our empirical application, we have
ound that, by reducing the relative weight of the
ublic administrations in decision bodies (a decision
imilar to that of partially privatizing a state owned
nterprise), the legislator is changing the structure
f priorities (i.e., it increases the weight of the
‘profit maximization’’ goal to the detriment of
ther goals such as ‘‘regional development’’) while
ausing only a slight increase in the overall perfor
ance index (in our analysis, IPR). Global ineffi
iency remains, nevertheless, high in our study
around 10%). Hence, to the extent that the differ
nces we found among the ownership structures in
he SBs sector are due to differences in technical effi
iency, any further reform should pay particular
ttention to the effects that new regulation may have
n enhancing the technical ability to transform
nputs into outputs, rather than in changing the mis
ion to favor more financial oriented goals.
Our study can be extended in different ways. First,
t may be of interest to pursue a more finely grained
nalysis of regulator preferences. In this application,
nd in accordance with European regulations, we
istinguished two types of banks: those where the
egislator has allocated control (more than 50% of
he votes) to public administrations and those where
his threshold of 50% in not surpassed. From this dis
ribution of control rights we inferred the regulator’s
references over the goals; preferences that were sub
equently incorporated into DEA assessments
hrough ordinal relations among weights. Therefore,
n attractive possibility for further refining the anal
sis of the impact of regulation on efficiency would
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each stakeholder. In this new scenario, it would be
possible to rewrite the constraints included into
DEA models. Moreover, proceeding in this way, it
would be also possible to define firm year specific
weight restrictions, as a function of the vote distribu
tion among stakeholders in its general meeting for
each year. As constraints become more severe, the
efficiency scores of assurance region models will
decrease, increasing allocative inefficiency.
Finally, future work should attempt to expand
the sample to include other organizational forms
such as commercial banks and credit cooperatives
that compete in the Spanish banking industry. Inter
estingly, these other types of banks also present sub
stantial differences in terms of regulation, ownership
structure and corporate goals. Thus, this richer data
set would allow us to examine in greater depth the
possible connections between regulation, ownership
structure and economic behavior. These issues will
be the subject of future research.
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